Fail back dust HTLC of local commitment tx after enough confirmations

Add test_failure_delay_htlc_local_commitment

Move some bits of check_spend_remote as we need to fail dust HTLCs
which can be spread on both prev/lastest local commitment tx

Author: Antoine Riard

src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

@@ -1637,42 +1637,75 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 	/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
 	/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
 	/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
-	fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
+	fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
 		let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
-		// TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that weren't included in the
-		// broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
-		// weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
+		let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
+		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+		macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
+			($height: expr, $update: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
+				log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation until {} height", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+				match self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+						entry.get_mut().push($update);
+					}
+					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+						entry.insert(vec![($update)]);
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
+			($updates: expr) => {
+				local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
+				spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
+				watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
+			}
+		}
+
 		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &local_tx.htlc_outputs {
+				if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
+					if let &Some(ref source) = source {
+						wait_threshold_conf!(height, (source.clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash);
+					}
+				}
+			}
 			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 				log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
 				match self.key_storage {
 					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
-						let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
-						return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)));
 					},
 					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-						let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
-						return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None));
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
 		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &local_tx.htlc_outputs {
+				if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
+					if let &Some(ref source) = source {
+						wait_threshold_conf!(height, (source.clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()), "previous", htlc.payment_hash);
+					}
+				}
+			}
 			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 				log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
 				match self.key_storage {
 					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
-						let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
-						return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)));
 					},
 					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-						let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
-						return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None));
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		(Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
+		(local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 	}
 
 	/// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.

src/ln/functional_tests.rs

@@ -5065,3 +5065,92 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
 	assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
 }
+
+fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
+	// Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+	// We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
+	// HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
+
+	let nodes = create_network(2);
+	let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+	let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+	// We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+	let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+	let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+	route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+	// Cache one local commitment tx as previous
+	let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+	// Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx 
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+	expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+	let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+	nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+	nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+	// Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
+	let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+	let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+	match events[0] {
+		MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
+			assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+	match events[1] {
+		MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
+			assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+
+	assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
+	// Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
+	let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+	if announce_latest {
+		nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+	} else {
+		nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+	}
+
+	let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+	assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+	match events[0] {
+		MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+
+	assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, 1, true,  header.bitcoin_hash());
+	let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+	// Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
+	assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+	let mut first_failed = false;
+	for event in events {
+		match event {
+			Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+				if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
+					assert!(!first_failed);
+					first_failed = true;
+				} else {
+					assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+				}
+			}
+			_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+	do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
+	do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
+}