f revert "Track HTLC on-chain value for HTLC-Success/-Timeout txn for balance"

Author: TheBlueMatt

lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

@@ -361,10 +361,6 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 	HTLCUpdate {
 		source: HTLCSource,
 		payment_hash: PaymentHash,
-		/// If the HTLC was claimed by an HTLC-Timeout transaction (ie when the HTLC exists on
-		/// chain), this is the amount of the output of that transaction (ie `htlc_value_satoshis`
-		/// minus fees).
-		onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 		htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 		/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
 		/// transaction which appeared on chain.
@@ -396,10 +392,6 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 	///    signature.
 	HTLCSpendConfirmation {
 		commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
-		/// If the HTLC was claimed by an HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction (ie when the
-		/// HTLC was not claimed via the revocation path), this is the amount of the output of that
-		/// transaction (ie `htlc_value_satoshis` minus fees).
-		onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 		/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
 		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 		/// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
@@ -447,7 +439,6 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
 		(1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
 		(2, payment_hash, required),
 		(3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
-		(5, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
 	},
 	(1, MaturingOutput) => {
 		(0, descriptor, required),
@@ -458,7 +449,6 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
 	},
 	(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
 		(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
-		(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
 		(2, preimage, option),
 		(4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
 	},
@@ -1744,7 +1734,6 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 									source: (**source).clone(),
 									payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
 									htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
-									onchain_value_satoshis: None,
 									commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
 								},
 							};
@@ -2677,7 +2666,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
 		for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
 			match entry.event {
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } => {
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
 					// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
 					#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 					{
@@ -2914,16 +2903,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 			let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 				!revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
-			let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
 
-			let claim_via_htlc_tx = accepted_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim;
-			if claim_via_htlc_tx {
-				// If the claim was via an HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success transaction, it must be a
-				// 1-in-1-out transaction as its pre-signed.
-				// Note that if anchors are available these both may vary.
-				debug_assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
-				debug_assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), 1);
-			}
+			#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
+			let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
 
 			let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
 			if accepted_preimage_claim {
@@ -2963,14 +2945,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			}
 
 			macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
-				($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr, $htlc_value_sats: expr) => {
+				($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
 					if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
 						for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
 							if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
 								if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
 									log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
-									payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash,
-										pending_htlc.amount_msat, $htlc_value_sats));
+									payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
 									break;
 								}
 							}
@@ -2983,24 +2964,18 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
 					for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
 						if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
-							let htlc_value_sats = if claim_via_htlc_tx {
-								tx.output.iter().map(|txout| txout.value).sum::<u64>()
-							} else { htlc_output.amount_msat / 1000 };
 							if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
 								log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
 								// We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
 								// holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
 								// transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
 								// has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
 								// resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
-								payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash,
-									htlc_output.amount_msat, htlc_value_sats));
+								payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
 							} else if !$holder_tx {
-								check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
-									htlc_output, htlc_value_sats);
+								check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
 								if payment_data.is_none() {
-									check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
-										htlc_output, htlc_value_sats);
+									check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
 								}
 							}
 							if payment_data.is_none() {
@@ -3011,7 +2986,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 										txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
 										event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
 											commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
-											onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc_value_sats),
 											preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
 												Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
 											// If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
@@ -3054,7 +3028,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 			// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
 			// HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
-			if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat, onchain_amount_sat)) = payment_data {
+			if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
 				if accepted_preimage_claim {
 					if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
 						|update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
@@ -3066,7 +3040,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 								commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
 								preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 								on_to_local_output_csv: None,
-								onchain_value_satoshis: Some(onchain_amount_sat),
 							},
 						});
 						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
@@ -3089,7 +3062,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 								commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
 								preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 								on_to_local_output_csv: None,
-								onchain_value_satoshis: Some(onchain_amount_sat),
 							},
 						});
 						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
@@ -3117,7 +3089,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							source, payment_hash,
 							htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
 							commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
-							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(onchain_amount_sat),
 						},
 					};
 					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());