Overhaul LocalCommitmentTx to new nomenclature

Author: Antoine Riard

lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
 
 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
+use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
 use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
 
 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
@@ -242,14 +242,14 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
 	//
 	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
 	// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
-	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
 
 	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
 	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
 	/// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever
 	/// get called once.
 	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
-	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
 
 	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
 	///
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
 	/// (implying they were considered dust at the time the commitment transaction was negotiated),
 	/// a corresponding None should be included in the return value. All other positions in the
 	/// return value must contain a signature.
-	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
+	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
 
 	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
 	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
@@ -499,24 +499,24 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 		Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
 	}
 
-	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 		let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 		let counterparty_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing");
 		let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_channel_data.counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
 
-		Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+		Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_holder_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
 	}
 
 	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
-	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 		let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 		let counterparty_channel_pubkeys = &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing").counterparty_channel_pubkeys;
 		let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
 
-		Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+		Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_holder_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
 	}
 
-	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
+	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 		let counterparty_selected_contest_delay = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().counterparty_selected_contest_delay;
 		holder_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, secp_ctx)
 	}