netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets

We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.

The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.

Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.

Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit b718121)

Orabug: 27774015
CVE: CVE-2018-1068

Signed-off-by: Tim Tianyang Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Anderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <[email protected]>

Author: Florian Westphal

net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c

@@ -2012,7 +2012,9 @@ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,
 		if (match_kern)
 			match_kern->match_size = ret;
 
-		WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left);
+		if (WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
 	}
 
@@ -2069,6 +2071,15 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base,
 	 *
 	 * offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0).
 	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 4 ; ++i) {
+		if (offsets[i] >= *total)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (i == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (offsets[i-1] > offsets[i])
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) {
 		struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32;
 		unsigned int size;