include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions

This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time.  Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.

GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation.  They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks.  Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.

This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code.  There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.

Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:

* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
  place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
  the source buffer.

* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.

* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
  some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
  glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
  approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.

* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
  option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
  time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.

Kees said:
 "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
  blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
  argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
  out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"

[[email protected]: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[[email protected]: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

Author: thestinger

arch/Kconfig

@@ -223,6 +223,12 @@ config GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
 config GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
        bool
 
+config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this when it can successfully
+	  build and run with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
+
 # Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h
 config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
 	bool

arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
 	select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI
 	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
+	select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE if (MEMORY_ISOLATION && COMPACTION) || CMA
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV

arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h

@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ extern int memcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
 #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len)
 #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len)
 #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n)
+
+#ifndef __NO_FORTIFY
+#define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */
+#endif
+
 #endif
 
 #endif

arch/powerpc/Kconfig

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ config PPC
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
 	select ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_COHERENT_MASK
 	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
+	select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_SCALED_CPUTIME		if VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE
 	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
 	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
 	select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
+	select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH

arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c

@@ -411,3 +411,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
 	debug_putstr("done.\nBooting the kernel.\n");
 	return output;
 }
+
+void fortify_panic(const char *name)
+{
+	error("detected buffer overflow");
+}

arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h

@@ -142,7 +142,9 @@ static __always_inline void *__constant_memcpy(void *to, const void *from,
 }
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY
+extern void *memcpy(void *, const void *, size_t);
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW
 
 #include <asm/mmx.h>
@@ -195,11 +197,15 @@ static inline void *__memcpy3d(void *to, const void *from, size_t len)
 #endif
 
 #endif
+#endif /* !CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
 void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
 
+extern int memcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
+#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 #define memcmp __builtin_memcmp
+#endif
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCHR
 extern void *memchr(const void *cs, int c, size_t count);
@@ -321,6 +327,8 @@ void *__constant_c_and_count_memset(void *s, unsigned long pattern,
 	 : __memset_generic((s), (c), (count)))
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET
+extern void *memset(void *, int, size_t);
+#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 #if (__GNUC__ >= 4)
 #define memset(s, c, count) __builtin_memset(s, c, count)
 #else
@@ -330,6 +338,7 @@ void *__constant_c_and_count_memset(void *s, unsigned long pattern,
 				 (count))				\
 	 : __memset((s), (c), (count)))
 #endif
+#endif /* !CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */
 
 /*
  * find the first occurrence of byte 'c', or 1 past the area if none

arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static __always_inline void *__inline_memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t
 extern void *memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len);
 extern void *__memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len);
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 #ifndef CONFIG_KMEMCHECK
 #if (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ < 3) || __GNUC__ < 4
 #define memcpy(dst, src, len)					\
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ extern void *__memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len);
  */
 #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __inline_memcpy((dst), (src), (len))
 #endif
+#endif /* !CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET
 void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n);
@@ -77,6 +79,11 @@ int strcmp(const char *cs, const char *ct);
 #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len)
 #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len)
 #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n)
+
+#ifndef __NO_FORTIFY
+#define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */
+#endif
+
 #endif
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY_MCSAFE 1

arch/x86/lib/memcpy_32.c

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 __visible void *memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t n)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW) && !defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
 	return __memcpy3d(to, from, n);
 #else
 	return __memcpy(to, from, n);

include/linux/string.h

@@ -193,4 +193,204 @@ static inline const char *kbasename(const char *path)
 	return tail ? tail + 1 : path;
 }
 
+#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __attribute__((gnu_inline))
+#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
+
+void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold;
+void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
+void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 2nd parameter");
+void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
+
+#if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
+	if (strscpy(p, q, p_size < q_size ? p_size : q_size) < 0)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return p;
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+		__write_overflow();
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
+	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return p;
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
+{
+	__kernel_size_t ret;
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __builtin_strlen(p);
+	ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
+	if (p_size <= ret)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	__kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
+	if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
+extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
+	ret = strlen(q);
+	if (size) {
+		size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret;
+		if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len >= p_size)
+			__write_overflow();
+		if (len >= p_size)
+			fortify_panic(__func__);
+		__builtin_memcpy(p, q, len);
+		p[len] = '\0';
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
+{
+	size_t p_len, copy_len;
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
+	p_len = strlen(p);
+	copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
+	if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	__builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
+	p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
+	return p;
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+		__write_overflow();
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __builtin_memset(p, c, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+		if (p_size < size)
+			__write_overflow();
+		if (q_size < size)
+			__read_overflow2();
+	}
+	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+		if (p_size < size)
+			__write_overflow();
+		if (q_size < size)
+			__read_overflow2();
+	}
+	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size);
+}
+
+extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+		__read_overflow();
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+		if (p_size < size)
+			__read_overflow();
+		if (q_size < size)
+			__read_overflow2();
+	}
+	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+		__read_overflow();
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size);
+}
+
+void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void *p, int c, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+		__read_overflow();
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
+}
+
+extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+		__read_overflow();
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_STRING_H_ */

lib/string.c

@@ -978,3 +978,10 @@ char *strreplace(char *s, char old, char new)
 	return s;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(strreplace);
+
+void fortify_panic(const char *name)
+{
+	pr_emerg("detected buffer overflow in %s\n", name);
+	BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fortify_panic);

security/Kconfig

@@ -163,6 +163,13 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
 	  been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
 	  trying to find such users.
 
+config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	help
+	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+
 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
 	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
 	help